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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT-LENGTH OF PRISON SENTENCES-The Supreme Court of
the United States has held that a mandatory life sentence imposed
under a state recidivist statute on a defendant convicted of three non-
violent felonies totaling $229 does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishmten
Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980).
In 1964 William James Rummel pleaded guilty to a Texas felony in-
dictment charging him with fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain
$80.00 worth of goods or services, a crime for which he was sentenced
to three years imprisonment.1 Five years later, in 1969, Rummel was
sentenced to a four-year prison term after pleading guilty to the felony
of passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. 2 Again, in 1973, the
State of Texas charged Rummel with another felony for allegedly ob-
taining $120.75 by false pretenses.3 This time, however, the state pro-
ceeded under its recidivist statute.' After the jury found Rummel guilty
1. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1134 (1980). TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art.
1555(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1973) (recodified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 32.31 (Vernon
1974)), provided that it shall be unlawful to present a credit card with the intent to
defraud to obtain an item of value or service of any type. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art.
1555(b)(4)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1973) (recodified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 32.31 (Ver-
non 1974)), set the threshold amount at $50 and provided for punishment from two to ten
years.
2. 100 S. Ct. at 1135. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 996 (Vernon 1961) (recodified at
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 32.31 (Vernon 1974)), provided that passing or attempting
to pass a forged instrument in writing is punishable by confinement in the penitentiary
from two to five years.
3. 100 S. Ct. at 1135. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1413 (Vernon 1953) (recodified at
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03 (Vernon 1974)), provided that the taking must be
wrongful or, if originally lawful, must be obtained by false pretext or with the intent to
deprive the owner thereof. Section 1410 which defines theft, has also been recodified and
can now be found at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03 (Vernon 1974).
Rummel was accused of accepting the funds to obtain and install a compressor in an
air conditioner. Instead, he endorsed the check with the names "Service Supply and
William Rummel," cashed it, and failed to obtain the compressor or to do the work. Rum-
mel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Because the amount in question
was over $50, the act constituted a felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1421 (Vernon
1953). Thus, Rummel's three felonies totaled $229.11.
4. 100 S. Ct. at 1135. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925) provided:
"Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than a capital offense
shall on such third conviction be imprisoned in the penitentiary for life." The Code now
provides:
If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previously
been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony convic-
tion is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction hav-
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of theft by false pretenses and found that he had been convicted of two
prior felonies, the court5 imposed the mandatory life sentence required
by Article 63 of the Texas Penal Code."
On appeal the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion.' Rummel then sought a writ of habeas corpus which was denied
without a hearing by both the state district court8 and the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals.' Rummel next sought collateral relief in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas where
he contended that his life sentence was so disproportionate to his
crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
eighth amendment."0 The district court, however, denied habeas corpus
relief on the eighth amendment claim." In March of 1978, a divided
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision and held that application of Arti-
cle 63's automatic life sentence to Rummel was cruel and unusual
because it was grossly disproportionate to his crimes." On rehearing
by the court en banc, the majority vacated the panel's opinion, af-
firmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, and held that
application of the state's habitual criminal statute to Rummel did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment." After denial of his petition
ing become final, on conviction he shall be punished by confinement in the Texas
Department of Corrections for life.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
5. According to Article 63 of the Code then in force, it was proper for the court,
after the jury found Rummel guilty of two prior noncapital felonies, to assess punishment.
Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630, 634 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
6. 100 S. Ct. at 1135.
7. Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Rummel's appeal
primarily challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the court's
withdrawal of the question from the jury. The issue of cruel and unusual punishment was
not raised. Id. at 632-34.
8. The writ was denied by the District Court for the 187th Judicial District of Bexar
County, Texas. Petition for Certiorari, Appendix A at 45A.
9. The writ was denied, without written order, on findings of the trial court. Id. at
44A.
10. Rummel v. Estelle, No. SA-76-CA-20 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1976). U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." In addition to harsh, cruel, and unusual
punishment, Rummel raised a second point of error, ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rummel v. Estelle, No. SA-76-CA-20 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1976).
11. Rummel v. Estelle, No. SA-76-CA-20 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1976).
12. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel opinion). The panel split
2-1.
13. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane). The court of appeals
voted 8-6 in vacating the decision of the panel. The case was then remanded to the panel
for reconsideration of a sixth amendment issue. The panel held that Rummel's petition
was legally sufficient to require a federal evidentiary hearing. Rummel v. Estelle, 590
F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1979) (panel opinion) (per curiam).
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for rehearing by the court of appeals," Rummel appealed to the United
States Supreme Court which granted certiorari. 5 The Supreme Court
held that the mandatory life sentence imposed on the petitioner did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth and the
fourteenth amendments.'
6
Speaking for the five-justice majority,'" Justice Rehnquist addressed
Rummel's challenge of the state's authority to levy a sentence of life
imprisonment, as opposed to a lengthy jail term, upon his conviction of
the third felony.'8 Relying on Weems v. United States,9 Rummel con-
tended that mandatory imposition of the life sentence was so dispro-
portionate to the offense for which he was convicted that it constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.' Notwithstanding this argument, the majority narrowly inter-
preted the Weems decision and ruled that the finding of dispropor-
tionality there could not be wrenched from the extreme facts of the
case.' Because the Weems opinion referred both to the length of the
prison term and to the punishment which accompanied it, the Court re-
jected Rummel's assertion that the length of Weems' imprisonment
formed an independent basis for that Court's decision.'
14. Rummel v. Estelle, No. 76-2946 (5th Cir. March 9, 1979).
15. Rummel v. Estelle, 441 U.S. 960 (1979).
16. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980).
17. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun joined in
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined.
18. 100 S. Ct. at 1136. Rummel did not challenge the constitutionality of the Texas
recidivist statute per se, an issue put to rest in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). In
Spencer the defendants argued unsuccessfully that the use of prior convictions in their
subsequent criminal trials violated fourteenth amendment due process. Id. at 559. Nor did
Rummel challenge the state's authority to label each of his offenses as felonies and punish
him by imprisonment. 100 S. Ct. at 1136.
19. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems the defendant was sentenced to the penalty of 15
years of eadena temporal for the crime of falsifying a public record. At a minimum,
Weems' sentence amounted to imprisonment for 12 years and a day, a chain at the ankle
and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor with "no assistance from friend or
relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation
even in the family council." Id. at 366.
20. 100 S. Ct. at 1138. Rummel argued that although the Weems Court based its deci-
sion in part on the inherent cruelty of the punishment, it also relied on the separate
ground that the eighth amendment prohibits excessively cruel punishment as well as in-
herently cruel forms of punishment, and that the length of punishment must be propor-
tioned to the offense. Petition for Certiorari at 21-22. The eighth amendment's guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
21. 100 S. Ct. at 1138.
22. Id. at 1139.
1980
Duquesne Law Review
The Court likewise rejected Rummel's argument that the indices of
disproportionality set forth in Coker v. Georgia,' against which he
measured the proportionality of his sentence, are applicable to a case
not involving the death penalty. The unique and irrevocable nature of
the death penalty, reasoned the majority, sets it apart from all other
forms of punishment, including prison sentences of any length. There-
fore, Coker and other cases in which death sentences were set aside as
violating the eighth amendment were determined to be inapplicable to
the fact situation presented in Rummel." The Court concluded that
Weems and the death penalty cases25 form a body of law so unique as
to make it readily distinguishable from cases involving prison terms
alone. The Court then reached the nucleus of its decision, that for
crimes concededly classifiable as felonies,"8 principles of federalism de-
mand that the length of prison sentence actually imposed be purely a
matter for the respective state legislatures to decide.'
The Court explained that its reluctance to review legislatively man-
dated sentences is reflected in recent decisions such as Coker where
23. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). The Coker Court indicated that punishment
exceeds the limits of the eighth amendment if it "(1) makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime." Id. at 592. In holding capital punishment for rape invalid on the second
ground, the Court focused on three indices of disproportionality: (1) the penalty for com-
parable offenses in the same jurisdiction; (2) the nature of the offense; and (3) the punish-
ment for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
With reference to these criteria Rummel argued that: (1) the nature of his offense
lacked the element of violence, threat of harm, skill in crime, or moral depravity
necessary to justify the sentence; (2) with the exception of one other jurisdiction, the law
"in no other American jurisdiction mandates a life sentence upon conviction of any three
felonies," because all either require at least one violent crime, impose a sentence less than
life, or grant sentencing discretion to the judge or jury; (3) except for murder, Texas does
not impose a life sentence "on even the most violent or depraved single or two-time of-
fenders." Moreover, argued Rummel, his third offense was made a misdemeanor eight
months after his trial, carrying a maximum sentence of only one year. Petition for Cer-
tiorari at 8-11.
24. 100 S. Ct. at 1138.
25. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty imposed as punishment for
rape); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty imposed for murder); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty considered in three cases, two involving a
murderer and a rapist in Georgia and one a rapist in Texas).
26. Crimes concededly classifiable as felonies include those punishable by significant
terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary. 100 S. Ct. at 1139.
27. Id. As an example of the diverse results which federalism can yield, Justice Rehn-
quist noted that in Arizona it is a felony to steal any "neat or horned animal," regardless
of its value. Id. at 1143. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-663(a) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1978).
California, on the other hand, considers the theft of "avocados, citrus or deciduous fruits,




Justice White observed that eighth amendment judgments should not
be merely the subjective views of the individual Justices, but should
be informed by objective factors.28 In attempting to provide the Court
with such objective criteria, Rummel repeatedly emphasized the
triviality of his crimes and their absence of violence. The Court
pointed out, however, that the presence or absence of violence does not
always reflect the strength of society's interest in deterring a par-
ticular crime. Nor is the small amount of money taken in each of Rum-
mel's crimes determinative, reasoned the majority, because to
recognize that Texas could have imprisoned him for stealing a larger
sum is to concede that the line-drawing process is within the province
of the state legislature.' Moreover, the Court concluded that Rummel,
by acknowledging the validity of recidivist statutes in general, conceded
Texas has a valid interest in so dealing with him and others who fall
into the class of persons circumscribed by those statutes.'
Finally, Rummel attempted to objectify the application of Article 63
to him by comparing Texas' scheme with recidivist statutes in other
states,3 ' and by offering evidence that the national trend is away from
mandatory life sentences and toward lighter, discretionary ones. 2 The
Court did not immediately evaluate this evidence; instead it examined
the operation of Article 63 as interpreted by the Texas courts, finding
it to be a societal decision that when a person commits three felonies
he should be incarcerated for life.' The majority then rejected Rum-
mel's interjurisdictional analysis, finding that although a comparison of
states that impose capital punishment for a specific offense with those
that do not is possible, a similar comparison where a noncapital offense
is concerned is far too complex."
The Court noted that Texas' relatively liberal policy of granting
good time credits to prisoners adds to the complexity. Although the
majority recognized that Rummel has no enforceable right to parole, it
reasoned that a proper assessment of Texas' treatment of him could not
28. 100 S. Ct. at 1140 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592).
29. 100 S. Ct. at 1140.
30. Id.
31. Rummel offered detailed charts and tables documenting the history of recidivist
statutes in the United States in support of his proposition that "no jurisdiction in the
United States or free world punishes habitual offenders as harshly as Texas." Petition for
Certiorari at 39.
32. 100 S. Ct. at 1143-44.
33. Id. at 1140. To invoke Article 63 the following events must occur: (1) a defendant
must be convicted of a felony and must be sent to prison; (2) after the defendant has been
convicted of the first felony, he must be convicted of a second felony, and again serve a
prison term; (3) after conviction and imprisonment for the second time, the defendant
must be convicted of a third felony. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d at 656.
34. 100 S. Ct. at 1142-43.
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ignore the possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for the rest
of his life.' As a second complicating factor the Court pointed to pros-
ecutorial discretion which, in the invoking of recidivist statutes,
operates to screen out the truly petty offender." Not only do such con-
siderations prevent an objective analysis by the Court, but even a find-
ing that Texas' statute was the most stringent of the fifty states would
not render Rummel's punishment unconstitutionally disproportionate,
reasoned Justice Rehnquist. Thus, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of Article 63 as applied to Rummel, ruling that the mandatory life
sentence imposed on him did not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the eighth and fourteenth- amendments. 7
In a brief concurring opinion Justice Stewart reiterated his state-
ment in Spencer v. Texas' that the Constitution gives the Court no
power to impose upon the criminal courts of Texas its own notions
about recidivist procedures. 9 Accordingly, Justice Stewart joined in the
majority opinion.'
Justice Powell, writing in dissent,"' reviewed the history of the
eighth amendment and concluded that the scope of the clause extends
not only to barbarous methods of punishment but also to those
punishments which are grossly disproportionate to the underlying of-
fense.42 Justice Powell found no historical justification for the
majority's application of the disproportionality principle to sentences
imposing death but not to noncapital cases." He maintained that in
35. Id. at 1142. The majority noted that parole is an established variation on im-
prisonment of convicted criminals. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477
(1972)).
36. 100 S. Ct. at 1143.
37. Id. at 1145. Reviewing criminal justice systems of the various states, the Court
pointed out that the line dividing felony from petty larceny varies markedly, and that
Texas is entitled to make its own judgment about where such line should lie. Further,
since Rummel is a repeat offender, Texas is not required to treat him as if this were his
first offense. Similarly, the point at which a recidivist is deemed to have demonstrated
the propensities that warrant his being separated from society is within the discretion of
the punishing jurisdiction. Id. at 1144-45.
38. 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
39. 100 S. Ct. at 1145 (Stewart, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1145 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined
in the dissenting opinion.
42. Id. at 1146 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that by 1400 the English
common law had embraced the principle that punishment should not be excessive either
in severity or in length. Id. at 1147 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
43. 100 S. Ct. at 1146 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell relied largely on Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), for this proposition. Id. at 1147 (Powell, J., dissen-
ting).
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both capital and noncapital cases the Court has recognized that Weems
proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime.4 Justice Powell further pointed out that, although Rummel may
not spend the rest of his life in jail, he has no right to an early release
because parole is an act of executive grace. 5 Thus, the majority's em-
phasis on good time credits and parole is misplaced, reasoned Justice
Powell, because the credits serve only to make Rummel eligible for
parole earlier; they do not guarantee release.46
Addressing the demand for objectivity in an eighth amendment
analysis, Justice Powell cited three factors which would minimize the
risk of constitutionalizing the views of individual judges. These include
(1) the nature of the offense, (2) the sentence imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions, and (3) the sentence imposed
upon other criminals in the same jurisdiction." Noting the small
amount of money involved in each of Rummel's crimes and the lack of
physical injury or threat of violence in them, Justice Powell found it
difficult to imagine felonies that pose less danger to the peace and
good order of society. He maintained that a review of recidivist
statutes in other jurisdictions, and of Texas' treatment of other
criminals, supports the view that a mandatory life sentence for the
commission of three nonviolent felonies is unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate. 8 Finally, Justice Powell observed that first and second time of-
fenders in Texas who commit more serious crimes than Rummel may
receive substantially less severe sentences."9 In its statutory scheme
44. Id. at 1147 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
45. 100 S. Ct. at 1150 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that in June, 1979,
the governor of Texas refused to grant parole to 79% of the state prisoners whom the
parole board recommended for release. Id.
46. Id. at 1149 (Powell, J., dissenting). Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979),
which held that a convicted person has no constitutional or inherent right to be released
prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, Justice Powell argued it would be cruelly
ironic to hold that the possibility of parole discounts a prisoner's sentence for purposes of
the eighth amendment. 100 S. Ct. at 1149 (Powell, J., dissenting).
47. 100 S. Ct. at 1150 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Weems v. Unites States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
48. 100 S. Ct. 1150-52 (Powell, J., dissenting). In none of the jurisdictions currently
employing habitual offender statutes could Rummel have received a mandatory life
sentence merely upon a showing that he committed three nonviolent property-related of-
fenses. Id. at 1152 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1153 (Powell, J., dissenting). Under the TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, §
12.42(a-(b) (Vernon 1974), a person who commits a second felony is punished as if he had
committed a felony of the next higher degree. Since second-degree rape carries a punish-
ment of between 2 and 20 years and first-degree aggravated rape is punished by 5 to 99
years imprisonment, id. at § 12.32-33 (Vernon Supp. 1979), a person who is twice convicted
of rape may receive a five-year sentence. 100 S. Ct. at 1153 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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for the punishment of two-time offenders, Texas recognizes that the
punishment should vary with the severity of the offense committed.
Yet, because all three-time offenders receive the same sentence, the
Texas system assumes they deserve the same punishment whether
they commit murder or cash fraudulent checks. Acknowledging that
the Constitution creates a sphere of state activity free from federal in-
terference, Justice Powell nevertheless concluded that when the court
uses objective criteria to apply the cruel and unusual punishment
clause against the states, it merely enforces an obligation created by
the Constitution."1 The dissenting Justice concluded that the sentence
imposed on Rummel would be viewed as grossly unjust by lawyers and
laymen alike and that it crosses the line separating lawful punishment
from that proscribed by the eighth amendment.52
Rummel v. Estelle is the Supreme Court's most recent interpreta-
tion of the eighth amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment, and the only decision in which it faced squarely the ques-
tion of whether the length of a prison term in and of itself might
violate that guarantee. While few in number, initial eighth amendment
challenges centered on the particular manner of punishment imposed
rather than the period of incarceration.' By 1890 the Court had decided
that the imposition of the death penalty by means of public execution,
shooting," or electrocution55 was not cruel and unusual.' Then, in 1892,
the notion that the length of a prison sentence in relation to the
underlying offense might cause it to be unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate received some attention for the first time in O'Neill v. Ver-
mont.57 Although the defendant in O'Neill did not specifically argue
that a fine for each of 307 offenses of selling intoxicating liquors was
cruel and unusual, Justice Field nevertheless wrote in dissent that the
50. 100 S. Ct. at 1153 (Powell, J., dissenting). See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, §
12.42(a(b); id, tit. 7, § 31.07; id, tit. 5, § 21.02 (Vernon 1974).
51. 100 S. Ct. at 1154 (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1156 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTER-
PRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).
54. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 345 (1879).
55. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
56. In these early cases the Court interpreted the eighth amendment by examining
whether the punishment or some similar variant was considered cruel and unusual in
1789. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETA-
TION S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1251-52 (1973). Indeed, in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436 (1890), the concern was whether "it is within [the] easy reach of electrical science at
this day to so generate and apply to the person of the convict a current of electricity of
such known and sufficient force as certainly to produce instantaneous, and, therefore,
painless, death." Id. at 443.
57. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
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eighth amendment prohibition is directed against punishments which
by their excessiveness are greatly disproportionate to the offense
charged.-" Against this background the prison sentence and attendant
punishments in Weems v. United States9 were struck down. Although
it is not clear whether the length of the prison sentence, apart from its
"accessories," formed an independent basis for the ruling in Weems, it
is apparent that the Court's purpose was to release the cruel and
unusual punishment clause from the early focus on the manner of pun-
ishment and make it applicable to current developments in penology,
which less frequently called for the infliction of physical cruelty.'
Shortly after Weems, a five-year prison term on each of seven counts
of mail fraud was found not to violate the eighth amendment." And in
1958, the use of denaturalization as punishment for desertion from the
armed forces was invalidated on eighth amendment grounds.2
More recently the eighth amendment has been used successfully to
overturn death sentences. In Coker v. Georgian the Supreme Court ap-
plied the criteria established a year earlier in Gregg v. Georgia,4
another capital punishment case, and held the death penalty to be
disproportionate to the crime of rape of an adult woman. The eighth
amendment was also the basis for striking down the death penalty in
three cases in Furman v. Georgia.65
The Courts in these capital cases reiterated the uniqueness of
capital punishment." Yet, contrary to the Court's reasoning, 7 the con-
clusion cannot necessarily be drawn that these cases are of limited
utility in deciding the constitutionality of a noncapital punishment such
as that inflicted in Rummel. Although in Gregg the Court reviewed the
58. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting).
59. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
60. See 217 U.S. at 372.
61. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916). Each count against Badders related
to a different letter and for each count he received concurrent five-year sentences and a
$1,000 fine. He argued unsuccessfully that making each letter a separate offense con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 393.
62. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
63. 433 U.S. 592 (1977).
64. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty for the crime of murder not per se a violation
of the eighth amendment, nor was it applied unconstitutionally to the defendant).
65. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
66. Concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Stewart stated:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its total
rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And
it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our con-
cept of humanity.
Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. 100 S. Ct. at 1138.
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imposition of the death penalty, the language of that case
demonstrates that a punishment, considered in the abstract, is ex-
cessive and, therefore, unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment," and (2) is grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime." Coker recognizes that a
given punishment might fail the test on either ground.70 Thus, taken
together, the two cases appear to allow that not only capital punish-
ment but punishment in general might be unconstitutionally excessive
if it is found to be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime. The Coker Court also addressed the key concern in Rummel
that judicial review of legislatively mandated sentences might become
merely an imposition on the states of the subjective views of the in-
dividual Justices.7 ' To avoid this result, Coker demands that to the
maximum extent possible such judgments must be based on objective
factors.72 Such factors include a consideration of public attitudes con-
cerning a particular sentence, history, precedent, legislative attitudes,
and the response of juries as reflected in their sentencing decisions.7 3
By distinguishing the death penalty cases and by limiting Weems to
its peculiar facts, the Court in Rummel left to state legislatures the
discretion to set the length of sentences for crimes concededly
classified as felonies. That discretion, however, had already been
granted to legislatures when recidivist statutes like that of Texas
were upheld against due process and equal protection challenges.7' The
68. By making no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, such
punishment will be nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering. 428 U.S. at 173.
69. Id.
70. 433 U.S. at 591-92. In Coker the Court reaffirmed the test established in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), then recognized that a punishment might fail on either
ground stating:
In sustaining the imposition of the death penalty in Gregg, however, the Court
firmly embraced the holdings and dicta from prior cases, [Furman; Robinson; Trop;
and Weems] to the effect that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those
punishments that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to
the crime committed. Under Gregg, a punishment is "excessive" and unconstitu-
tional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. A punish-
ment might fail the test on either ground.
433 U.S. at 591-92 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 592.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Spencer challenged Texas' then-
existing procedure whereby under its habitual criminal statute the jury trying the pen-
ding criminal charge was made aware of past convictions. The Spencer Court noted that,
in general, such recidivist statutes have withstood due process and equal protection
challenges. Id. at 560.
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issue in Rummel was not whether, as a general matter, it is within a
state's power to enact recidivist statutes. Rather, the question was
whether, while recognizing that states have the power to determine
the length of sentences for felonies, this same reasoning should pre-
vent the courts from striking down an otherwise valid statute when in
a particular situation it conflicts with the eighth amendment. Rummel
claimed that imposition of Texas' recidivist scheme on him was cruel
and unusual; he did not argue that Texas did not have the power
generally to determine the punishment for his crimes. Yet, out of a
concern that the views of individual Justices might be substituted for
those of the legislature, the Court deferred to the states. However,
judicial enforcement of the cruel and unusual punishment clause cannot
be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have the
power to prescribe punishment for crimes."6 For to view -the eighth
amendment in terms of due process or equal protection deprives it of a
dimension which is latent in almost all of the previous decisions, that it
is an independent, potent moral force which is at the disposal of the
judiciary to check the power of the legislature.8
If the objective criteria outlined in Gregg and Coker would permit
Court review of Rummel's noncapital punishment, the remaining issue
is whether the possibility of parole so complicates the analysis that
any interjurisdictional comparison of prison sentences is made imprac-
tical.7 The possibility of parole based on good time credits does com-
plicate such an analysis. But since a convicted person has neither a
constitutional nor an inherent right to be conditionally released before
expiration of a valid sentence, 8 such possibilities should not be taken
into account. In Texas, good conduct time applies only to eligibility for
parole, and otherwise does not affect an inmate's term. 9 It is a
75. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 269. The Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), stated, "it is equally plain that the existence of the death penalty is not a license to
the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagina-
tion." Id. at 99.
76. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment?, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 24-25.
77. See 100 S. Ct. at 1142-43. The Rummel Court stated:
Nor do Rummel's extensive charts even begin to reflect the complexity of the
comparison he asks this Court to make. Texas, we are told, has a relatively liberal
policy of granting "good time" credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has
allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as little
as 12 years .... We agree with Rummel that his inability to enforce any "right" to
parole precludes us from treating his life sentence as if it were equivalent to a
sentence of 12 years. Nevertheless ... a proper assessment of Texas' treatment of
Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned
for the rest of his life.
Id.
78. Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
79. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1 § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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privilege and not a right, and may be forfeited by rules violations
while in prison." Similarly, parole is not a right but an act of grace by
the state."' It is classified as a conditional pardon in Texas" and is not
considered as a reduction in sentence by the state." Because the court
considered mere possibilities of parole, Rummel's eighth amendment
challenge failed in part because of the existence of an expectation of
early release which he has no constitutional right to enforce.
Prior to Rummel, federal courts appeared willing to review prison
sentences under the eighth amendment.u Although the Supreme Court
had not previously invalidated a prison sentence solely because of its
length, earlier cases implied that judicial review under the eighth
amendment was permissible." Now, determinations of prison terms by
state legislatures will not be disturbed on eighth amendment
grounds," for the cruel and unususal punishment clause has merged in-
80. Id.
81. Clifford v. Beto, 464 F.2d 1191, 1195 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Johnson v. Wells,
566 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1978); Craft v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 550 F.2d
1054, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977).
82. Ex parte Lefors, 165 Tex. Crim. 51, 303 S.W.2d 394 (Crim. App. 1957).
83. TEx. CODE CalM. PRoC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 22 (Vernon 1979) provides, "When the
Governor revokes a person's parole ... that person may be required to serve the portion
remaining of the sentence on which he was released, such portion remaining to be
calculated without credit for the time from the date of his release to the date of revoca-
tion."
84. Federal courts have indicated a willingness to review state law in this area, at
times striking down as excessive both death sentences and prison terms. The court in
Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979), con-
sidered a provision of the New York Penal Code which levied a sentence of six years to
life for possession of a controlled substance. Although finding the provision not to be un-
constitutional as applied, the court recognized that in some extraordinary circumstances a
severe sentence for a minor offense could, solely because of its length, be cruel and
unusual. Id. at 409. A Maryland statute authorizing capital punishment for rape was in-
validated in Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942
(1972), on the basis that it was disproportionate to the crime when the victim's life was
neither taken nor endangered. And in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974), a case virtually identical to Rummel, a defendant successfully
attacked on an eighth amendment basis West Virginia's recidivist statute's mandatory life
imprisonment as applied to him.
85. See generally Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
86. Outside the legal community some thought that concern about federalism should
not have prevented the Court from overturning Rummel's sentence. One editorial
recognized judicial deference to the views of legislatures but nevertheless argued that
"when punishment is as out of proportion as it was here, the danger is not that federalism
will be imperilled, or that justices will become roving commissioners. It is that law, not to
mention federalism, will be made contemptible." Washington Star, March 20, 1980, § A, at
13, col. 1. Other editorials appearing shortly after the Rummel decision adopted Justice
Powell's position that the punishment was grossly disproportionate. See N.Y. Times,
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to the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses and has no independent existence to be used to review lengthy
sentences for comparatively minor crimes.
Albert A. Torrence
March 22, 1980, at 20, col. 1 ("Would any sentence be so out of line as to violate the
Court's sense of decency?"); 230 THE NATION 387-88 (1980) ("One would have thought that
preventing such cruel aberrations is just what the Supreme Court and the Eighth Amend-
ment were created to do.").

